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Abstract 
Although metaphysics has made an impressive comeback over the past half century, 
there are still a great many philosophers today who think it is bullshit, under 
numerous precisifications of ‘That’s just bullshit’ so that it’s a negative assessment 
and doesn’t apply to most philosophy (so it singles out metaphysics as particularly 
worse off than most other fields of philosophy). One encounters this attitude 
countless times in casual conversations, social media, and occasionally in print (e.g. 
Ladyman and Ross, 2007). Is it true? 
 
What would suffice to show that metaphysics is not bullshit? 
Here is one answer: show that a large and diverse group of metaphysical problems aren’t bullshit. 
Then their good status would buttress metaphysics itself, at least to a significant degree. But what 
would suffice to show that a particular metaphysical problem isn’t bullshit? 
An answer: show that there are no tame, dismissive solutions to the problem.1 And we could show 
that there are no tame, dismissive solutions if we could offer an analysis of the metaphysical problem 
that showed that the problem itself forces one to embrace highly counterintuitive claims no matter 
what position one takes on it, assuming one doesn’t fool around but makes the effort to offer a 
thorough response. Hence, if we can prove that a given metaphysical problem forces one to accept 
highly counterintuitive claims no matter what position one takes on it, then we will have shown that 
that problem is not bullshit. And if we can show that a large and diverse group of metaphysical 
problems satisfy that antecedent, then we will have shown that metaphysics itself isn’t bullshit, to a 
significant degree. Can it be done? 
In answering that question we will construct a particularly profitable way to analyze a philosophical 
problem. 
The Problem of the Many is a typical metaphysical problem in that reflection on it generates bizarre 
philosophical views, such as the view that one thing can be numerically identical with many things, 
or the view that there are millions of ordinary trees where common sense says there is just one tree. 
One could easily suspect that it is a good example of a bullshit metaphysical problem. Anyone who 
talks to a diverse group of philosophers has heard the BS complaint many, many times. 
                                                 
1 Previous attempts along this line include Schwitzgebel 2014, Frances 2019, and Frances 2021. 
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Consider the following perspicuous rendition of the Problem of the Many:  
C1: There is at least one tree in my backyard. 
C2: Every tree in my backyard is exhaustively (not partially) composed of chemical atoms. 
C3: For every tree in my backyard that is exhaustively composed of chemical atoms (at a time), there 
is a group of chemical atoms that composes it (at that time).2 (Some would say, with reason, 
that there is exactly one such group; C3 is more cautious.) 
C4: For every group of chemical atoms that composes a tree in my backyard, there is a group of 
chemical atoms with at least some distinct chemical atoms that composes a tree in my backyard. 
(The large groups (about 1030 chemical atoms in each) in question are literally about 
99.9999999999999999999999999999% overlapping and are, to all appearances, equally good 
candidates for composing a tree.) 
C5: No tree in my backyard is exhaustively composed of distinctly-membered (in chemical atoms) 
groups of chemical atoms. 
C6: There is at most one tree in my backyard. 
On the face of it, the Cs are collectively inconsistent, since one can easily derive ~C6 from the first five Cs 
using simple inferences (more on that below). 
This essay is not concerned with the solutions to the Problem of the Many or any other classic 
metaphysical problem. I don’t care what your favored solution is, and it won’t matter to my 
arguments at all. Instead, we are focusing on the philosophically significant consequences of these 
problems themselves, not specific proposed solutions to them. 
There are exactly eight possibilities with regard to the Cs, P1-P8: the first six collectively cover all the ways 







P7: C1 & C2 & C3 & C4 & C5 & C6 & there is no truth-preserving derivation to a contradiction 
P8: C1 & C2 & C3 & C4 & C5 & C6 & there is a truth-preserving derivation to a contradiction 
The reader can verify with mere sentential logic that the disjunction of the eight Ps is true. Thus, the 
disjunction of the eight Ps is logically true. 
Let’s examine only the obvious, immediate philosophical consequences of each disjunct, P1-P8. I will not 
be arguing that any particular disjunct is true (or not true). Instead, my commentaries on the disjuncts are 
meant to prove that each disjunct is philosophically counterintuitive, pretty much no matter how one 
                                                 
2 All references to composition are to a particular moment and to chemical, not mereological, atoms. 
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reasonably makes that notion precise. One can precisify it this way: a claim is philosophically 
counterintuitive at a time if and only if (i) if the claim is true, then a great many of our ordinary beliefs 
and/or a significant portion of our most confidently held ordinary beliefs or belief-dispositions are 
false, or (ii) if the claim is true, then key philosophical ideas held by a large portion of philosophers 
at that time are false. Thus put, ‘philosophically counterintuitive’ might not be the best term. 
‘Philosophically significant’ and ‘philosophically consequential’ were considered. Set aside aptness of 
vocabulary. 
P1: It’s not the case that there is at least one tree in my backyard. 
It might seem obvious that P1 is philosophically counterintuitive. Any ordinary person or botanist would 
swear on their life that there is a tree in my backyard; so, P1 is about as counterintuitive as a claim can get. 
If P1 is true, then due to the great number and variety of Problem of the Many applications, this will mean 
that an incredible number and variety of commonsensical claims aren’t true (e.g. there won’t be any 
people or cars either). Hence, if there aren’t any trees in my backyard, then a great many of our ordinary 
beliefs, or a significant portion of our most confidently held ordinary beliefs or belief-dispositions, 
are not true. 
There is, however, another possibility. Suppose P1 is true in this article, so ‘There is at least one tree in my 
backyard’ isn’t true as that sentence is used in this work of philosophy. Even so, perhaps tokens of that sentence 
type are true when used in ordinary discourse. And if P1 is true in ordinary discourse, then its being false in 
philosophical discourse may not be nearly as counterintuitive; in addition, it won’t follow, at least immediately, 
that a great many of our ordinary beliefs, or a significant portion of our most confidently held ordinary 
beliefs or belief-dispositions, are not true. 
This type of situation is not unheard of. For instance, everyday discourse employing ‘miracle’, ‘conscious’, 
‘believe’, and ‘justified’ might not match up with philosophical discourse using the same terms, since the 
two discourses often (not always) employ different relevant meanings (i.e. ones that change truth-value). 
The following sentences, appearing in philosophical discourse, should raise a red flag: 
If her belief was not justified, then ‘Her belief was justified’ isn’t true in ordinary discourse. 
If there are no miracles, then ‘There are miracles’ isn’t true in ordinary discourse. 
When I argued above that P1 is philosophically counterintuitive, it’s at least arguable that I tacitly 
employed a similar premise in my argument: 
1. If P1 is true, then ‘It’s not the case that there is at least one tree in my backyard’ is true in the 
discourse I am using right now in this article. 
2. If that sentence is true in the discourse I’m using right now in this article, then it’s true in ordinary 
discourse. 
3. If it’s true in ordinary discourse, then a great many of our ordinary beliefs, or a significant 
portion of our most confidently held ordinary beliefs or belief-dispositions, are not true. 
4. Hence, by (1)-(3) if P1 is true, then a great many of our ordinary beliefs, or a significant portion 
of our most confidently held ordinary beliefs or belief-dispositions, are not true. 
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Sure enough, if premise (2) is true, then P1 is philosophically counterintuitive (since (1) and (3) are true 
and {(1)-(3)} entails (4), as the conditionals are material). But is (2) true? 
There are five good reasons for thinking that (2) is true. First, there aren’t any problematic terms here 
similar to ‘miracle’ or ‘justified’; hence, that particular reason to be suspicious of (2) fails to apply. Second, 
I am explicitly saying—right now, if you like—that I am using, in this article, ordinary English—unless, of 
course, I supplement it with philosophical jargon, which clearly doesn’t appear in the Cs. Third, there are 
good reasons, offered by Timothy Williamson (forthcoming; cf. van Inwagen, 2014), for thinking that 
philosophers are using ordinary English in their discussions of the ontology of the everyday world. Fourth, 
even if there is a language typically used in the “ontology room” that makes ‘There are trees’ express a 
proposition truth-conditionally different from the one it expresses in ordinary English, I am explicitly 
saying I’m not using that philosophical language and I am using ordinary English—and such a proclamation 
should shift the linguistic interpretation as appropriate. Fifth, there doesn’t seem to be anything 
preventing me from using ‘There is at least one tree in my backyard’ with its ordinary meaning. In short, 
there is little good reason to think (2) isn’t true, and there is excellent reason to think it is true. 
But what if I simply am unable, in this article, to use ordinary English in my analysis of the Cs no matter 
what I say or do? Amazingly enough, it doesn’t matter! Suppose the arguments of the previous paragraph 
are unsound and (2) isn’t true, so ‘There is at least one tree in my backyard’ has different truth-values in 
ordinary discourse and in this article, despite the fact that C1 is a sentence of perfectly ordinary English (however 
one wants to spell that out) and I have insisted that I am using ordinary English. Well, that would mean that we 
have been wildly wrong about linguistic interpretation—a philosophically counterintuitive result. 
Hence, I am not claiming or even faintly suggesting that (2) is true, although that’s what I suspect is the case. 
Instead, I’m saying that we have a philosophically counterintuitive result whether or not (2) is true. 
In sum, here’s my argument, with symbolization guidance regarding the entailments: 
a. If P1 is true in ordinary discourse, then a great many of our ordinary beliefs and/or a significant 
portion of our most confidently held ordinary beliefs or belief-dispositions are false. (A  Z1) 
b. If (i) P1 is not true in ordinary discourse but (ii) P1 is true in this article, (iii) I have instructed that 
tokens of P1 in this article belong to ordinary English (even if they could belong to another 
language), and (iv) P1 does not contain any philosophical jargon not in ordinary English, then key 
philosophical ideas held by many contemporary philosophers are false. [(~A & B & C & D)  
Z2] 
c. I have instructed that tokens of P1 in this article belong to ordinary English (even if they could 
belong to another language), and P1 does not contain any philosophical jargon not in ordinary 
English. (C & D) 
d. Hence, by (a)-(c), if P1 is true in this article, then either (i) a great many of our ordinary beliefs 
and/or a significant portion of our most confidently held ordinary beliefs or belief-
dispositions are false, or (ii) key philosophical ideas held by many contemporary philosophers 
are false. B  (Z1 v Z2) 
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e. Hence, by (d) and the definition of ‘philosophically counterintuitive’, P1 is philosophically 
counterintuitive. 
We will encounter other premises like (2). Each has the form ‘If ‘S’ is true in the discourse I’m using right 
now, then it’s true in ordinary discourse’. I will call them bridge premises since they purport to bridge the 
alleged gap between my sentences in this article and ordinary discourse. The philosophical discourse need 
not belong to ontology, as other paradoxes come from other areas of metaphysics as well as other 
subfields of philosophy. 
P2: It’s not the case that every tree in my backyard is exhaustively composed of chemical atoms. 
If P2 is true in this article, then ‘It’s not the case that every tree in my backyard is exhaustively composed 
of chemical atoms’ is true in this article. But if that is true in this article, then it’s true in ordinary discourse. 
If it’s true in ordinary discourse, then we have a philosophically counterintuitive result, as any scientifically 
informed person could tell you. And if it’s not true in ordinary discourse, because the relevant bridge 
premise is false, we still have a philosophically counterintuitive result for the same reason we had one in 
the case of P1. 
P3: It’s not the case that for every tree in my backyard that is exhaustively composed of chemical 
atoms, there is a group of chemical atoms that composes it. 
If P3 is true in this article, then a tree in my backyard is exhaustively composed of chemical atoms but 
there is no group of atoms that composes it. If so, that is philosophically counterintuitive, as it goes firmly 
against key philosophical ideas held by many philosophers, if not natural scientists. A toy airplane is 
composed of Legos and there is a group of Legos that composes it (those 345 Legos that were in the box 
from the store); whereas a tree is composed of atoms but there is no group of atoms that composes it. 
That’s the oddity. 
P4: It’s not the case that for every group of chemical atoms that composes a tree in my backyard, 
there is a group of chemical atoms with at least some distinct chemical atoms that composes a 
tree in my backyard. 
If P4 is true in this article, then there is a group of chemical atoms, G, that composes a tree in my 
backyard—call that tree TG—but there is no distinctly-membered group of atoms that composes a tree in 
my backyard. Clearly, G has got to have something like 1030 chemical atoms (give or take a few orders of 
magnitude) in order to compose a tree in my backyard, as atoms are very small compared to ordinary 
trees in backyards. So, now take groups G1-Gmillion, each of which contains the atoms in G plus or minus 
exactly one borderline case chemical atom. Given the way ordinary trees are, with enormous numbers of 
borderline cases of atoms, it’s clear that these million Gs exist provided G exists. If P4 is true, then none of 
G1-Gmillion compose a tree in my backyard. Hence, there are over a million perfectly ordinary treeish 
groups of atoms that are literally 99.9999999999999999999999999999% overlapping but only one 
of which composes a tree in my backyard. 
P4 is not saying that those other Gs fail to compose TG specifically. Instead, it’s saying that those other 
Gs fail to compose any tree at all (clearly, if they don’t compose a tree in my backyard, they don’t 
compose one elsewhere). Either those other Gs don’t compose anything at all—but how is G so 
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magical compared to them that it composes something while they don’t?—or they do compose 
things but those things aren’t trees—but how could those things not be trees if the thing exhaustively 
composed by virtually identical G is a tree? This means that a perfectly ordinary use of ‘tree in my 
backyard’ is stupefyingly, staggeringly precise, favoring G over G1-Gmillion despite their virtual identity. But 
how on earth did ‘is a tree in my backyard’ acquire such an amazingly discriminating meaning? No one has offered 
even the faintest plausible story, and there is good reason to think none is forthcoming. 
Obviously, one could offer a stipulation regarding ‘is a tree in my backyard’ so that under the resulting 
interpretation P4 is true and not philosophically counterintuitive. This would be similar to choosing a 
sharp cutoff for ‘is rich’. However, that fact doesn’t suggest for an instant that the sentence already, 
in the actual world prior to our possible stipulation, has an accurate interpretation with that 
consequence. 
If you accept P4, then you surely have to wonder what shocking falsehoods there are about language 
and thought that you have hitherto presumed in all your work. Perhaps you have grown comfortable 
with accepting many other comparably outrageous epistemicist ideas, such as the idea that a 
perfectly ordinary token of ‘The restaurant is a short walk from here’ goes from true to not true in 
the space of a yoctometer (10-24 m). It’s great that you have managed to accept linguistic miracles: 
it’s impressive that you have gotten over your previous discomfort with some radical claims. But then 
why think your continuing discomfort with any other radical claim isn’t misguided as well? 
There are two points here, worth distinguishing. First, there’s the one is just made: if there can be 
over a million perfectly ordinary treeish groups of chemical atoms that are literally 
99.9999999999999999999999999999% overlapping but only one of which composes a tree in my 
backyard—if our ordinary words and thoughts have such incredibly exact meanings—then I could be 
wrong about a great many commonsensical claims about meaning. 
Second, the grounds of meaning are made positively magical. Shifting over to the restaurant case for 
the sake of variety: who would have thought that if one puts all the factors that help fix linguistic 
meanings into one pot, that pot would give a perfectly ordinary utterance token of ‘The restaurant is 
a short walk from here’—an utterance token made in certain highly specific circumstances, so we 
avoid speaker contextual issues—a truth condition that can distinguish two situations a yoctometer 
apart? If someone who used ‘short walk’ in the distant past had, counterfactually, farted during their 
utterance, or had a sore little toe that made him not want to make the walk to his favorite restaurant, 
would the true/untrue cutoff for the restaurant sentence token ended up at 1026 + 117.11111 ym 
instead of 1026 + 117.11112 ym? No one has the slightest remotely plausible idea how perfectly 
ordinary token utterances of ordinary sentences such as those could ever acquire such utterly 
miraculous discriminating truth conditions. The alternative idea that these sharp cutoff facts are 
marvelous yet brute, so there is no pot of things that fix meanings, would show, once again, that we 
are wildly wrong about meaning and thought (there may be brute facts, but the sharp cutoff facts for 
tokens of ‘There is a pumpkin by the tree’ and ‘The restaurant is a short walk from here’ aren’t among 
them). 
To be sure, I’m not suggesting that P4 or any of the other seven disjuncts is false! (Regarding my 
commentary on P4, see Horgan, 1997 and Williamson, 1997a, 1997b.) There’s no adequate argument 
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here for or against epistemicism, dialethism, compositional nihilism, or anything else. I’ve argued 
only that P4 is philosophically counterintuitive since it is inconsistent with key philosophical ideas held 
by many contemporary philosophers. 
P5: It’s not the case that no tree in my backyard is exhaustively composed of distinctly-membered (in 
chemical atoms) groups of chemical atoms. 
If P5 is true in this article, then there are at least two distinctly-membered groups of atoms that both 
compose (at a time) the very same tree in my backyard. Since the groups differ in atom membership, there 
is chemical atom in one but not the other; call such an atom A. Hence, it appears that at a particular 
moment the tree is partially composed of A and not partially composed of A. Unless we have made a truly 
fundamental error in how to think of composition at a time, we have a contradiction (millions of them, for 
other Problem-of-the-Many cases). In any case, the result is philosophically counterintuitive since it goes 
against key philosophical ideas held by many contemporary philosophers. 
P6: It’s not the case that there is at most one tree in my backyard. 
If P6 is true in this article, then there are at least two trees in my backyard—despite the fact that any non-
philosopher or botanist would swear on their life that there’s just one tree there. I omit the standard 
comments on the relevant bridge premise. 
P7: C1 & C2 & C3 & C4 & C5 & C6 & there is no truth-preserving derivation to a contradiction. 
If you gaze at C1-C5, you’ll be able to work out how to infer ~C6 from them using just four elementary 
inferences. If P7 is true, then at least one of the four is not truth-preserving (or the inference from P and 
Q to (P & Q) isn’t truth-preserving). Here are the four inferences: 
I1: From 
C1: There is at least one tree in my backyard 
C2: Every tree in my backyard is exhaustively composed of chemical atoms 
To 
There is at least one tree in my backyard that is exhaustively composed of chemical atoms. 
I2: From 
There is at least one tree in my backyard that is exhaustively composed of chemical atoms 
C3: For every tree in my backyard that is exhaustively composed of chemical atoms, there is a group 
of chemical atoms that composes it 
To 
There is at least one group of chemical atoms that composes a tree in my backyard. 
I3: From 
There is at least one group of chemical atoms that composes a tree in my backyard 
C4: For every group of chemical atoms that composes a tree in my backyard, there is a group of 
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chemical atoms with at least some distinct chemical atoms that composes a tree in my backyard 
To 
There are groups of chemical atoms that are distinctly-membered (in chemical atoms) and that both 
compose trees in my backyard. 
I4: From 
There are groups of chemical atoms that are distinctly-membered (in chemical atoms) and that both 
compose trees in my backyard 
C5: No tree in my backyard is exhaustively composed of distinctly-membered (in chemical atoms) 
groups of chemical atoms 
To 
~C6: It is not the case that there is at most one tree in my backyard. 
It is very difficult to see how any of these four inferences fails to be truth-preserving, which is what the 
truth of P7 requires. To say this is not to assume or imply that first-order logic can “capture” the logical 
form of each of C1-C6, whatever ‘capture’ means here. Even if first-order logic cannot “capture” at least 
one of the Cs, it would be philosophically counterintuitive to learn that one of I1-I4 isn’t truth-preserving. 
The significance of P7 comes from its disjunctive consequences: either the inference-types are truth-
preserving but we have badly misunderstood the meanings of the C sentences (so the rules are fine but 
don’t apply to at least one of the Cs), or we have understood the meanings of the C sentences but the 
inference-types aren’t truth-preserving (the meanings are fine but the rules aren’t). (Or both the rules and 
meanings aren’t fine.) Hence, the truth of P7 would have profound implications for either (a) how we 
understand linguistic meaning, since the Cs are quite simple sentences but we don’t understand them or 
(b) how we understand logic, since the inferences are quite simple and seemingly truth-preserving. And 
recall the point made earlier: there is an enormous number and variety of instances of the Problem of the 
Many, so (a) and (b) go far beyond the six Cs. Hence, P7 is philosophically counterintuitive. 
P8: C1 & C2 & C3 & C4 & C5 & C6 & there is a truth-preserving derivation to a contradiction. 
If P8 is true, then two things follow. First, C6 isn’t true (because P8 says the obvious derivation to the 
contradiction (C6 & ~C6) goes through), which is philosophically counterintuitive for the reasons given for 
P6. Second, C6 is both true and not true, which is philosophically counterintuitive as well—especially since 
none of the Cs is even a paradoxical sentence, such as those from the Liar and other semantic paradoxes. 
Since there is an enormous variety and number of cases that fit the Problem of the Many template, if we 
think the one I’ve used above regarding the tree in my backyard reveals a pair of true contradictory claims, 
then an enormous variety and number of other pairs of contradictory claims are true too (even if we 
adopt a paraconsistent logic, so that it’s not the case that everything follows from just the 
contradiction in the backyard tree case). 
My arguments regarding the obvious, immediate philosophical consequences of the individual P disjuncts, 
plus the logically true premise that at least one P disjunct is true, show that at least one of the following 
is both true and philosophically counterintuitive: 
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 ‘There are no trees’ is true in ordinary discourse. (First disjunctive consequence of P1; the other 
disjunctive consequence, from the bridge premise, is covered in the last bullet point.) 
 ‘Trees aren’t composed of chemical atoms’ is true in ordinary discourse. (First disjunctive 
consequence of P2; the other disjunctive consequence, from the bridge premise, is covered in the 
last bullet point.) 
 Trees are composed of chemical atoms but for a given tree there’s no group of chemical atoms 
that composes it. (P3.) 
 ‘Tree in my backyard’ (as well as an enormous number of similar phrases) is amazingly precise in 
the sense that there are there are over a million perfectly ordinary treeish groups of chemical 
atoms in my backyard that are literally 99.9999999999999999999999999999% overlapping 
but only one thing satisfies ‘tree in my backyard’. (P4.) 
 At any given time, a tree is composed of multiple groups of chemical atoms that differ in atom 
membership (so the tree is composed of a group of chemical atoms that includes atom X but the 
tree is also, simultaneously, composed of a group of chemical atoms that fails to include X). (P5.) 
 ‘There are at least two trees in my backyard’ is true in ordinary discourse despite the fact that any 
non-philosopher or botanist would swear on their life that there’s just one tree there. (First 
disjunctive consequence of P6 and P8; the other disjunctive consequence of P6 is covered in the 
last bullet point.) 
 Some of the simplest and most certain inference rules aren’t truth-preserving when applied to 
relatively simple, non-paradoxical sentences, so we have been wildly wrong about elementary 
logic; or we have little idea how to interpret an enormous number and variety of our ordinary, 
everyday, simple, non-paradoxical sentences. (P7.) 
 There are a great many true contradictions coming from ordinary sentences (not weird, liar-
type ones), even assuming a paraconsistent logic. (Second disjunctive consequence of P8.) 
 P1, P2, and P6 are true in this article but false in ordinary discourse, despite not containing 
philosophical jargon and contrary to my author instructions. (Second disjunctive 
consequence of P1, P2, and P6.) 
If you insist that either (i) the disjunction of the Ps isn’t true (despite having every appearance of a 
logical truth), or (ii) the disjunction of the above bullet points isn’t true, that’s fine: I still win, in the 
sense that the Problem of the Many forces one to take a philosophically counterintuitive view if one 
takes any serious view at all. That’s because your view on the Problem of the Many, whether it’s (i) 
or (ii), is highly philosophically counterintuitive, as characterized earlier. You might object: “No! 
Properly understood, my view is not counterintuitive”. Fine: I still win, because the idea that your 
view, (i) or (ii), isn’t wildly counterintuitive is itself wildly counterintuitive. No matter what you say 
about the Problem of the Many, you end up endorsing a philosophically counterintuitive view. You 
can of course just shut up and refuse to take any stand at all, but that’s neither here nor there. 




Def: R is philosophical paradox = R is a plurality of claims C1-Cn such that upon consistent 
disambiguation (i) each Ci comes from the same philosophical problem, (ii) each Ci is 
individually highly plausible, (iii) it is highly plausible that there is a truth-preserving 
derivation from the Cs to a contradiction, and (iv) no proper sub-plurality of R satisfies (i)-
(iii). 
I include the bit about disambiguation in order to make sure that a philosophical problem that fits 
the four conditions isn’t a pseudo-problem. For example, the three sentences, ‘We have mental 
processes’, ‘If something is mental, then it’s not physical’, and ‘We are entirely physical’ each have 
interpretations in non-philosophical contexts that are highly plausible. For the sake of a clean 
example, pretend that outside of philosophical discourse, occurrences of ‘mental’ sometimes (not 
always) have a truth-conditional contribution such that ‘x is mental’ requires the truth of ‘x isn’t 
physical’ (so in this scenario ‘mental’ is unlike terms such as ‘hydrogen’, for which deference to 
experts is prevalent). Pretend also that in philosophical discourse ‘mental’ has no such connection to 
‘not physical’. The three sentences fail to generate a paradox because upon consistent 
disambiguation—so we interpret ‘mental’ univocally in the first two sentences—at least one of the 
Cs is highly contentious, to say the least. So, clause (ii) of the stipulation is not satisfied. 
I add clause (iv) in an attempt to make sure R doesn’t include anything irrelevant to the philosophical 
problem it is intended to capture (e.g. we should not add ‘Trees are made of molecules’ to C1-C6, 
since the six Cs are all that’s needed to produce the derivation to a contradiction). As an alternative 
to (iv), we could just say “Do not include anything irrelevant in R”. 
I intend that many if not all of the traditional metaphysical paradoxes satisfy the stipulation’s four 
conditions. This is part of the beauty of metaphysics: it’s frequently the case that metaphysical 
problems are formulated in such a way as to satisfy (i)-(iv)—a feature that is not true of discourse on 
many other philosophical problems. 
Def: C is a component of philosophical paradox R = C is exactly one of R. 
Def: X is the Disjunctive Analysis, DA, of philosophical paradox R = X is the disjunction of: the 
negation of each component of R, the conjunction of the components of R plus the claim 
that there is a truth-preserving derivation from R to a contradiction, and the conjunction of 
the components of R plus the claim that there is no truth-preserving derivation from R to a 
contradiction. 
For the Problem of the Many, the DA is the disjunction of the eight Ps. More generally, if there are n 
components of paradox R, then there are (n + 2) disjuncts of R’s DA. DAs are disjunctive logical truths 
and serve as stepping stones to other key disjunctive truths: 
Def: X is a Consequence Disjunction, CD, of philosophical paradox R = X is a disjunction of obvious, 
immediate philosophically releveant consequences of all the disjuncts of the Disjunctive 
Analysis of R. 
For the Problem of the Many, one CD is the disjunction of the nine bullet points preceding these four 
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definitions. I can’t think of any good reason for the idea that a given R must have just one CD, although 
in order to be sure of the truth of the CD we restrict ourselves to the obvious, immediate 
consequences of each disjunct of the corresponding DA (as illustrated by my arguments leading to 
the CD above). 
Consider these five theses: 
T1: The Problem of the Many has a true Consequence Disjunction, given above. 
T2: Each disjunct of that CD is currently philosophically counterintuitive in the sense articulated 
earlier. 
T3: If a philosophical problem generates a CD each disjunct of which is philosophically 
counterintuitive, then that problem is not bullshit. 
T4: Many other metaphysical problems generate CD disjunctions that make T1 and T2 true. 
T5: If T1-T4 are true, then metaphysics isn’t bullshit. 
My arguments regarding the obvious, immediate consequences of each of the Ps, with the 
conclusions of those arguments summarized in the CD, are clearly sound, as they were so 
unambitious. So, T1 is true. Moreover, even a casual appreciation of the nine disjuncts of the CD is 
enough to see that each is philosophically counterintuitive (this is a sociological fact, not a normative 
one). Hence, T2 is true too. 
Since T3 is a universalized conditional, in order to cast doubt on it one has to make a strong case that 
there are bullshit philosophical problems that under consistent disambiguation have a CD each 
disjunct of which is currently philosophically counterintuitive. If my experience in philosophy is any 
guide, most BS philosophical problems once put in paradox form (which includes being stripped of 
relevant disambiguations) inevitably have a component claim that is highly contentious. Indeed, 
most BS philosophical problems are so hopeless that one cannot put them in paradox form at all. 
One might object to T3 on the grounds that disputes about the CD disjuncts are “merely verbal”. 
However, the arguments for the counterintuitiveness of the CD disjuncts addressed questions of 
interpretation, so platitudes about the prevalence of context dependence and other linguistic 
shenanigans are useless here. In addition, the use of ‘merely’ is crucial. Even if disputes about the CD 
disjuncts (all nine of them? Seriously?) are “verbal”, that does not, at all, mean they are “merely 
verbal”. Even if the disputes about each of the CD disjuncts were really about language in some deep 
sense, there isn’t the slightest reason to think they all have the import of disputing ‘Does that 
ridiculous drink count as a martini?’ (cf. Bennett 2009). 
In addition, thesis T4 (defended next) entails that there are a great many disjuncts, from CDs 
generated from other metaphysical problems. It’s hardly plausible that the disputes about every 
disjunct from every metaphysical CD are merely verbal. 
Regarding T4: similar proofs of other true CDs can be constructed in the same fashion using materials 
from other metaphysical chestnuts such as the Statue-Clay problem, the Ship of Theseus problem, 
the Tibbles-Tib problem, van Inwagen’s argument for incompatibilism, paradoxes about color tokens, 
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the Sorites paradox, etc. This is not to say that the CD disjuncts in question are, in each case, as 
philosophically counterintuitive as those for the Problem of the Many. They aren’t, but that hardly 
matters to the truth of T4. Further, some of those problems are a mixture of metaphysics and other 
fields such as the philosophy of language, mind, or logic, but that hardly matters either: many 
philosophical problems having nothing to do with metaphysics are a mix. If the philosophical 
significance of metaphysics lies mainly in the philosophy of language and logic, well, that is fine: that 
hardly suggests that metaphysics is bullshit. 
Roughly put, what is needed to prove a surprising CD is this: a philosophy problem that under 
consistent disambiguation generates a set of highly intuitive claims such that when subject to highly 
intuitively truth-preserving inference rules, can be used to derive the negation of a highly intuitive 
claim. Those conditions are satisfied for problems in other fields of philosophy as well, thereby 
showing that those problems aren’t bullshit either: Curry’s Paradox, the Grelling-Nelson paradox, the 
No-No paradox, the Paradox of the Knower, Fitch’s paradox, the Surprise Exam, the St. Petersburg 
paradox, the Suspense paradox, Russell’s paradox, Yablo’s paradox, the Dogmatism paradox, the Liar 
paradox, the Preface paradox, the argument for skepticism, the relativity of simultaneity paradox, 
etc. 
One could object to T5 on the grounds that the proofs of the CDs do nothing to solve any controversial 
philosophical problem. For instance, even after accepting the proofs we don’t thereby come to know 
whether dialetheism is true, whether epistemicism is true, whether the simple inference rules in 
question are truth-preserving, whether trees are composed of chemical atoms, etc. I agree. But that 
fact fails to suggest that T5 is false. The theses show that metaphysics isn’t bullshit; they aren’t 
intended to solve any philosophical problem other than the metaphilosophical one of ‘Is metaphysics 
bullshit?’. 
A much better objection to T5 is that even though I’m right that there are a bunch of non-bullshit 
problems in metaphysics, much of its unique jargon is so ill-defined that many discussions using that 
term are hopelessly muddled. The key terms in the objection are ‘much’ and ‘many’, since using ‘some’ 
would hardly distinguish metaphysics from other areas of philosophy. To be clear, there is nothing in this 
article that rules out the possibility that the problem of jargon-muddle is significantly worse in metaphysics 
than other areas. However, the onus is on the critic to make the comparative point. That would be a large 
project. 
Finally, I’m not merely saying that metaphysics has some philosophically important problems. I’m saying 
that (i) starting from several classic metaphysical problems we can construct (ii) proofs that (iii) establish 
the existence of philosophically counterintuitive truths—although the oddity, as we have seen, is that we 
aren’t sure which philosophically counterintuitive disjuncts of the CDs are the true ones. That should go a 
long way in showing, by concrete examples, that metaphysics isn’t bullshit. It might not be a shining city 
on a hill, filled with nothing but lovely, morally upstanding problems and issues, but it’s not the slum many 
have accused it of being. Although I have not argued for the thesis here, I think that since metaphysics has 
(i)-(iii) going for it, and some other areas of philosophy do not (that’s the bit I haven’t argued for), 
metaphysics is, to a certain extent, further from being bullshit than those other areas of philosophy. 
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